SGS authentication is a new protocol which not only enables a receiver to identify the source of a received message but also prevents a third party from identifying the source of the message. This protocol removes the deficiency of Deffie-Hellman algorithm which is man-in-middle attack by extending the Deffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm using trusted center. In this paper, Firstly, we present the initial design and evaluation of man in middle attack in Deffie-Hellman Key Exchange algorithm. Secondly, we present the protocol which will extend the algorithm to avoid man-in-middle attack using trusted center. This protocol ensures the securely exchange of the key between two entities controlled by SGS server.
Let's consider a scenario in a communication system with Alice and Bob. They hope that: 1) Bob wants
to identify that a received message is truly from Alice; 2) Alice wants to identify that a received message is truly from Bob. SGS authentication protocol could achieve Alice and Bob's requirements.
Keywords: Deffie-Hellman Algorithm, DCP, SGS Server, Man-in-middle attack.
[...] Node A decrypt the message by PRA, and timestamp_ID matching starts by node A Acknowledgement procedure depends upon the particular sliding window protocol used. S_KEY YA R_KEY YB C_KEY K When C wants to communicate? If C wants to communicate with then the same procedure will be called as that of A wants to communicate with B. The request will be generated from SGS server to if A accepts the request, A will calculate another Key i.e. YA1 to be sent to C and make a copy in the registry table at SGS server. [...]
[...] Design of SGS Protocol Calculation of Secret Key by User A X K = A mod q SGS protocol has been designed to prevent the man in middle attack by using Authenticity and also Central Database. Central Database store Registry table, which has the structure like this: NODE ID Key Figure 2. COM Calculation of Secret Key by User B K = B mod q X Figure Man in middle attack in Deffie-Hellman: Node A and Node B wants to transmit data securely. [...]
[...] As the keys are being exchanged securely by the SGS server, so no man in middle attack is possible at time of key exchange mechanism. As the message is encrypted with two keys , so If the intruder gets the sent message, it is very difficult for the intruder to decrypt the message. Also the key is selected randomly from the set of keys. More number of keys make the cryptanalysis to find out the key effortless Encryption Algorithm When the key is calculated by the nodes, and they have to encrypt the message. [...]
[...] T8- specifies the forward message Architecture of SGS protocol Figure 4 specifies the architecture of Central Database stores the registry table and also the TBL_DCP table. DCP is the server process which handles the communication between node(s) and central database. YA, YB, YC are the keys generated by the nodes respectively. PUA, PUB PUC are the public keys of C respectively. PRA, PRB, PRC are the private keys of nodes C respectively. IPA, IPB, IPC are the keys assigned to the nodes respectively by the DCP. [...]
[...] The key exchange protocol is vulnerable to such an attack because it does not authenticate the participants. This vulnerability will be overcome with the use of the SGS protocol. Figure 4. NODE ID is the node with communication is going on. S_KEY is the key sent to the communicating node. R_KEY is the key received from respectively communicating node. C_KEY is the calculated key according to the deffie-hellman Algorithm Responsibility of DCP DCP is known as distributor and control process, it is the core process of the SGS protocol. [...]
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