Marriage is a specific kind of contract "based upon a voluntary private agreement by a man and a woman to become husband and wife?. So in a sense, marriage is a contract like another one, the only difference being that the two contracting parties are strictly determined by the law as "only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife".
In the beginning, the American family law was influenced by the "Christian conception of marriage as a sacrament, a holy union between a man and a woman". Thanks to its power, Christianity indeed managed to make its rule the law of Britain and later, the law of the United States. In this context, divorce was almost impossible because the Christian idea was that marriage is an "indissoluble union". However, with mounting pressures from different groups, some states in America decided to authorize divorce as soon as the beginning of the 19th century.
[...] Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co Max RHEINSTEIN. Marriage Stability, Divorce, and the Law. Chicago: University of Chicago Press Anthony DNES, Robert ROWTHORN. The Law and Economics of Marriage and Divorce. New York: Cambridge University Press p.192. Roderick PHILLIPS. Untying the knot. A short History of Divorce. New York: Cambridge University Press p Anthony DNES, Robert ROWTHORN. The Law and Economics of Marriage and Divorce. New York: Cambridge University Press p.192. Max RHEINSTEIN. Marriage Stability, Divorce, and the Law. Chicago: University of Chicago Press Robert [...]
[...] For instance, at a specific time, a change in the divorce rates could be caused more by a change in tax rates than by a change in divorce law. Bibliography - Richard POSNER. Economic Analysis of Law. Boston: Little Brown and Company (cf. Chap on Family Law) - Anthony DNES, Robert ROWTHORN. The Law and Economics of Marriage and Divorce. New York: Cambridge University Press - Roderick PHILLIPS. Putting asunder. A history of divorce in Western society. New York: Cambridge University Press - Margaret F. BRINIG. From Contract to Covenant. Beyond the Law and Economics of the Family. Cambridge: Harvard University Press - Max RHEINSTEIN. [...]
[...] Marriage “penalties” are the “higher taxes required from some married couples than for the same two people filing two separate tax returns”[17]. According to a study, “marriage penalties induce a small but significant increase in the propensity to divorce for women, with a smaller effect for men”[18]. Conclusion In conclusion, this study of divorce law in a law and economics perspective shows us a good example where law, by ignoring social reality, can completely “fail to address the law problems of a large part of the population”[19]. [...]
[...] However, these last years, some scholars have argued that the no-fault divorce system makes divorce too easy and that it does not give the right incentives to people because they decide now sometimes under the no-fault divorce system to divorce although their marriage was efficient. II. The economics of the no-fault divorce First of all, divorce laws affect the behaviors of people in their everyday life. Several studies have already shown that people who have difficulties with their spouse are unhappy and thus are less productive in their work than people who lead happy lives. [...]
[...] Code collection, Title Chap.1, Introduced by the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). Lenore J. WEITZMAN. The Divorce Revolution. The Unexpected Social and Economic Consequences for Women and Children in America. New York: The Free Press p.1. Ibid, p.5. Lenore J. WEITZMAN. The Divorce Revolution. The Unexpected Social and Economic Consequences for Women and Children in America. New York: The Free Press p.15. Lenore J. WEITZMAN. The Divorce Revolution. The Unexpected Social and Economic Consequences for Women and Children in America. [...]
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