The Europe of 25 members is a factor of chances but also of risks. The enlarged European Union will not be the same at a bigger scale. The sphere of action of the European institutions is changing and it has to be adapted to a brand new structure. The socio-economic disparities between the Europe of 15 and the 10 new members require a new repartition of the European budget and new economic instruments of redistribution.
[...] Maybe, the role of the Franco-German couple is about to change in the EU of 25. The attitude of the tandem was felt as arrogant and authoritarian by many new members of the EU. For example, reminding Poland and Spain to stick to the rules while themselves were breaking the rules of the Growth and Stability Pact was perceived as a blatant change in the negotiating culture that had prevailed up to that point. This new leadership style irritated most EU members.[3] So we must keep in mind that the issue of elaborating a common foreign policy is highly political more than institutional. [...]
[...] The enlargement will increase this split within Europe, which “tends to create concentric circles in favour of the rich zones, populated and developed, to the detriment of the peripheries which attract less and less capital and people”.[7] The trends to the reinforcement of the inequality are perceptible in the situation of the new members. The Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) are concentrated in three new member states (Poland, Hungary, and Czech Republic) and more particularly around their capital cities. The enlargement will only confirm the trend towards more inequalities and the increasing need for larger redistribution. [...]
[...] In a Europe of 25 members, the increase in the number of governments will make this right more likely to be used in key fields for the future of the Union. The problem still remains that unanimity will be the rule for the revision of the Constitution. It will be hard to modify parts of the Constitution once adopted, and to find a common ground for the reforms. The repartition of votes within the Council must also be redefined to integrate the ten new members and give them the means to participate in the elaboration of new policies. [...]
[...] The old certainties about the future of the Union become more and more woolly, as even all countries do not share the same project and desire concerning Europe. What remains perennial is the common will to progress together within the Union to achieve better living conditions for all the citizens of Europe, and realize the ideals of the founding fathers. Bibliography: G. Amato, the longterm implications of EU enlargement : culture and national identity,, (Florence : European University Institute, 1999). [...]
[...] From this fear, is born the idea in France as in Germany or in the countries of Benelux that the only way to save the enlarged Union would be to introduce differentiation: Jacques Delors was proposing an “avant-garde of countries which could go further in the integration process; otherwise the possibility to extend the co operations between countries which want to go further in the integration process, without waiting for the others in fields such as defence or economic agreements. The entry of ten new members in the European Union actually stresses the political demands of the periphery. The Union of 25 will soon have to incorporate new members such as Romania, Bulgaria, and maybe in the long term Turkey. So this “super-enlarged Union obviously won't look like the previous one. Two options seem to emerge: the one of closer cooperations leading to a differentiated Europe, structured in concentric circles. [...]
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