Nuclear weapons and world order

Extract

[...] In the case of nonproliferation, states seeking nuclear weapons and states seeking to deter proliferation are usually in a radically asymmetrical relationship of power. As Smith argues in his article, “Deterrence and Counterproliferation in an Age of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” asymmetries in power and interests undermine the traditional expectations of deterrence theory, that states are predictably risk averse and do not gamble with their own survival.[4] Historically, Smith argues, there have been cases where weaker states feel they have no other option but to attack, or wager that aggression will secure a political victory if the stronger state wants to avoid conflict and capitulates.[5] prospect of unpredictable leaders with unknown levels of risk acceptance poses substantial problems for deterrence theory . [...]

[...] Department of Defense defines deterrence as state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counter action.”[2] Deterrence theory was the foundation for most Cold War security policy the United States and Soviet Union maintained nuclear arsenals to achieve “mutual second strike capability.” This meant that both powers had enough weapons to guarantee that, if attacked, they could launch a devastating retaliatory strike. This assured second strike capability was meant to deter either side from attacking first, thus making nuclear weapons effectively unusable. [...]

[...] Paranoid states describe those that are in a conventionally stable security position, but nonetheless feel threatened by an unpredictable adversary, for example South Korea vis a vis North Korea.[9] Pariah states, which Betts describes as the “thorniest problem of describe states who are isolated regionally and/or internationally, for example Israel.[10] Betts' emphasis on varying sources of insecurity that motivate proliferation leads him to reject overarching solutions to proliferation in favor of responses that are tailored to insecurities of paranoid, pariah, or pygmy candidates.”[11] Attending to these particularities, he argues, will “improve the clarity and realism in non-proliferation policy, make it seem less arrogant and naïve to the candidate countries, and make the whole enterprise less of a blustering, blundering, quixotic mess.”[12] While the arguments summarized above point to the problem of non- generalizable state interests and levels risk aversion based on geopolitical positioning, other critiques of state rationality have slipped into reductionist claims about irrational leaders and/or societies, which posit Western actors as rational and non-Western actors as backward, pathological, and irrational.[13] For example, Charles Ikle argues that the West is threatened by a “cultural schism” in which a progressive, scientific culture is threatened by another “animated by religious faiths, ethnic and national traditions, and societal customs.”[14] Ikle warns that when authoritarian leaders motivated by the former cultural mode acquire technologies of destruction made possible by the latter, Western society will be at great risk. [...]