UN Security Council Resolution 1559 and US multilateralism

Extract

[...] The other issue addresses by the resolution (the disbanding of Hizbullah) was not solved, and the war between Israel and Lebanon and subsequent political deadlock in Lebanon do not allow us to be optimistic about it. The U.S. resort to the U.N. Security Council and its cooperation with France on the issue of Lebanon were probably exceptional in many ways, especially in the aftermath of the Iraq war. But although this strategy has been successful, it is not indicative of a definite U.S. [...]

[...] The Security Council adopted Resolution 1559 only a few hours before the parliamentary vote, in an attempt to send a clear message to the Syrian regime, which was directly targeted in the U.S. Ambassador's speech to the Council.[7] Security Council Resolution 1559 is exceptional Policy shift Back to multilateralism after the war in Iraq Cooperation with France after the war in Iraq Who would have imagined, a few months after the diplomatic standoff between France and the United States on Iraq, that both countries would join forces to introduce a common resolution on the Middle East? [...]

[...] strategy until Resolution 1559 was to pressure unilaterally Syria through economic sanctions, but since September 2004 the Bush Administration has discovered that Security Council resolutions could also provide an effective political pressure tool on the Syrian regime:[14] while economic sanctions can be criticized for not affecting the regime directly but rather the impoverished Syrian citizens, the legitimacy of U.N. resolutions are harder to challenge. Also, the economic sanctions decided unilaterally by the U.S. against Syria did not have any support from the rest of the international community, especially within the European Union.[15] Unfortunately, this policy has shown its limits, since Syria has not changed its problematic behaviors.[16] Hadley, then the deputy national security advisor, noted that U.S. and European policies toward Syria were characterized by “imperfect coordination.”[17]In fact, U.S. [...]

[...] The resolution acquired a popular legitimacy that Bush and Chirac would have probably never imagined, and the Cedar Revolution symbolized, in a way, the success of multilateral diplomacy and democratization when it was endorsed by a majority of citizens. In fact, French and even American flags were waived during the demonstrations demanding the Syrian withdrawal. The perception of the U.S. changed subtly in Lebanon as opposition parties and Lebanese citizens themselves welcomed the pressure that the Bush Administration put on Syria.[22] An unexpected third actor entered the game: the Lebanese people themselves. Syria couldn't resist to the combined pressure of the international community, the peoples of Lebanon, and the legitimacy that their demands had in international law. [...]

[...] Instead, the advantage of Resolution 1559 was that it involved broad multilateral cooperation and a firm international condemnation of Syria with a much greater political impact on Assad's regime. But in fact it's only selective engagement Why did the U.S. take this decision? Messianic essence of the resolution: Bush policy towards ME and reflects US constitutional and historical exceptionalism Strategic: use of force not an option, need to use France The American willingness to work with France on the issue of Lebanon also stems from strategic factors. [...]