The Arab oil embargo of 1973 had no significant effect in changing the United States pro-Israeli policies, as the threat of an economic sanction alone did not induce policy changes. The embargo did however influence U.S. policy changes toward OPEC member countries, especially in the Middle East region where U.S. pushed for a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Domestically, it compelled the United States to seek alternate sources of energy and establish institutions to deal with the lack of oil during the embargo as well as develop preventative methods for the future while attempting to lessen its dependency on OPEC countries.
[...] After the embargo, the United States began to increase its attention toward the security of the Middle East in order to make certain oil producing countries were not threatened in any way which would impede United States acquisition of oil.[xxxvii] Arab nations criticized the United States for its lack of attention to the Middle East prior to the embargo, but since then, Kissinger devoted much of his time on trying to negotiate a settle of the Arab-Israeli conflict.[xxxviii] Kissinger's efforts of shuttle diplomacy between Israel and Egypt were noticed by Egyptian President Sadat, who detected progress in United States policy in January 1974.[xxxix] Saudi Arabia was the “central bank of the world oil market,”[xl] and the United States recognized this concerning their policies toward Saudi Arabia. [...]
[...] Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007) p 51. [iii] Major Cozy E. Bailey, “U.S. Policy Toward Israel: The Special Relationship,” 1990. Ibid Cheryl A. Rubenberg, Israel and the American National Interest, A Critical Examination (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1986) p 51. Eric Watkins, Unfolding US Policy in the Middle International Affairs, Vol No (Jan. 1997) p 3. [vii] Rubenberg 50 [viii] Mearsheimer and Walt 43 Ibid 40 Ibid 40 Ibid 26 [xii] Ibid 26 [xiii] Ibid 37 [xiv] Ibid 42 The Middle East [xvi] Ibid 168 [xvii] Rubenberg 91 [xviii] The Middle East [xix] Ibid 170 Mearsheimer and Walt [xxi] Ibid [xxii] The Middle East [xxiii] Ibid [xxiv] Mearsheimer and Walt [xxv] Ibid [xxvi] The Middle East [xxvii] Ibid [xxviii] Bailey [xxix] Mearsheimer and Walt [xxx] Ibid [xxxi] Abdolhamid Gholamnezhad, “Critical Choices for OPEC Members and the United States,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol No (March 1981) [xxxii] Ibid [xxxiii] The Middle East [xxxiv] Ibid [xxxv] Ibid [xxxvi] Gholamnezhad [xxxvii] Dr. [...]
[...] Israel and the U.S. have been sharing intelligence for the past thirty years, as the United States provides American weapons to use in battles, in doing so, the United States can test the effectiveness of its weapons and determine whether or not they need to alter the weapons.[iii] In the 1982 Lebanon War, Israel got hold of remains of Soviet weaponry, such as MiG 23 and MiG25, to gain a better perspective as to the ability of the Soviets.[iv] However, when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1989, one was left wondering what else Israel provides for the United States. [...]
[...] On November President Nixon initiated Project Independence, which sought to attain self sufficient energy by 1980.[xlvii] President Ford signed the Energy Policy and Conservation Act in 1975 and in 1977 President Carter labeled energy independence a priority of U.S. national interest when he established the U.S. Department of Energy.[xlviii] Congress also endorsed the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) in the Energy Policy and Conservation Act which contained enough oil sufficient for 90 days in case of another embargo. The embargo also caused the United States to create the International Energy Agency (IEA) which created a plan of action incase of another embargo as well. [...]
[...] However, Kissinger allowed Israel to break the order so Israel could “consolidate its military position.”[xxiv] It wasn't until the cease fire completely broke down and the Soviets threatened to intervene that the United States and Kissinger told Israel that it was time to obey the cease-fire order.[xxv] In 1975 Kissinger and President Ford were upset with the lack of effort by Israel to attempt to negotiate peace with Egypt and Syria and attempted to pressure Israel into becoming more cooperative in the negotiations by suspending Israel's request for $ 2.5 billion in economic and military aid.[xxvi] However, when Arab-Israeli negotiations began again in June of 1975, U.S. [...]
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