“The great non sequitur committed by defenders of the State, including the classical Aristotelian and Thomist philosophers, is to leap from the necessity of society to the necessity of the State” , noted the American anarcho-capitalist Murray N. Rothbard (1926-1995). Indeed, what justifies the authority that the political institutions have over their citizens? What justifies the obedience of the population? And, what justifies a State? The questioning of the concept of a State is at the core of modern political discussions. While some States, such as the USRR, abruptly vanished in the XXth century or, others like Somalia, have been called “faint”, an aspiration for a State remains ever growing, as might be proven with the current developments in Kosovo. Indeed, the necessity of the State being asserted as early as in the XVth century by Niccolo Machiavelli, and since the XIXth century, the State has become a usual form of societal organization - natural, accepted and justified. With the development of market capitalism and the breakdown of feudalism, was seen the emergence of liberalism, a philosophy committed to individualism and rationality, that brought answers to the teeming questions about the State – its birth, its construction, its necessity and even its form. The question of legitimacy of a State, and hence its acceptance by the population, has conspicuously found an explanation in liberal social contract theories, which have attempted to elucidate, in a variety of ways, the rationale behind the erection of a legitimate state authority, and the consent of the governed to obey to the political obligation it induces. The social contract theories may be broadly divided into two main currents – contractarianism and contractualism. Contractarianism, based on the writings of Thomas Hobbes, is a social contract theory based on the self-interest of the governed. By concluding a contract with others, an individual, in his pursuit of happiness, seeks to maximize his own interest. Contractualism, derived from the writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and equally present in John Locke and John Rawls works, has a radically different basis for the creation of a social contract – its rationality and justifiability.
[...] It is interesting to note, that, despite the modernity of Rawls' contractualism the substance of the State he describes is similar to that of Locke and Rousseau. Rawls argues for the preservation of basic liberties, and also of certain economic guarantees moral intuitions about the good. Precisely, Rawls defines two principles of justice that are meant to guide a new State derived from the deliberations in the original position. Firstly, the “liberty principle” specifies that “each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others”.[44] This principle implies “political liberty, and freedom of speech and assembly, liberty of conscience and freedom of thought, freedom of person . [...]
[...] Rousseau also adopts a liberal conception of the State, but calls for a different political regime and organization, which would frame the civil society. His liberalism is clear in the sense that, similar to Locke or Rawls, he affirms that convention which stipulates absolute authority on one hand and unlimited obedience on the other, is vain and contradictory”[55]. Yet, it is not the division of power in three branches that forms the basis of his political conception. Humanity being naturally good in the state of nature, he advocates a political community based on popular sovereignty. [...]
[...] As he notes himself, aim is to present conception of justice which generalizes and carries to a higher level of abstraction the familiar theory of the social contract as found, say, in Locke, Rousseau and Kant.” (Rawls, p.1038) Yet, considering the multiple similarities between Rawls and other contractualists, and the very fact that he looks for a justifiable agreement between the citizens, we cannot but include Rawls into the contractualist pattern of thought. (Rawls, p.1038) Naturally, we shall focus on specific writings: Locke's Second Treatise of Government (1689), Rousseau's Discourse on the Origins of Inequality (1754) and The Social Contract (1762), and, finally, Rawls' A Theory of Justice (1971). [...]
[...] Despite this divergence of Rawls from Locke and Rousseau as to necessity of the civil state which is ever more hypothetical, the three authors agree on the nature of a social contract as something that is legitimate and just, and thus demands the obedience of all “signatories”. For Locke, great and chief end of men's uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property”[34]. Hence, as each man can obtain property by removing an object out of the common state by labor, a social contract is a legitimate association of equal proprietors, based on non-violation of the right to property of others, property being seen here in the sense of “mutual preservation of lives, liberties and estates”[35]. [...]
[...] In somewhat utilitarian terms, the law of nature prescribes a harmless and tolerant coexistence of men.[19] Rousseau rejects the existence of any kind of an indicator of a civil society noting that men are guided only by the feeling of “compassion”[20] for one another. Yet, Rawls transcends these simple considerations of natural laws and human feelings, to state that the original position is governed by and creates reasonable conceptions of good. Equality through the veil of ignorance, implies that each person, not knowing who he is, cares about everyone, so that “justice fairness”[21]. [...]
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