The International Community response to the 2006 North Korean nuclear crisis: overcoming stick-and-carrot diplomacy?

Lucrece A.

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The International Community response to the 2006 North Korean nuclear crisis: overcoming stick-and-carrot diplomacy?

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South Korea, North Korea, Washington, Pyongyang, crisis, negotiations, diplomacy, nuclear test

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Abstract

On October 9, 2006, the North Korean state news agency announced that the country had completed its first nuclear test with success. This "great leap forward" was the first step toward a "powerful self-reliant defense capability". In the following days, Moscow and Washington confirmed that North Korea had conducted an underground nuclear test, yielding an explosion of approximately 1 kiloton, compared to roughly 21 kilotons for the bomb at Nagasaki. Officially, North Korea became the 9th nuclear power, following the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan and Israel. Experts believed that Pyongyang had the technology to strike its closest neighbors: South Korea, Japan and parts of China, its closest ally. Nevertheless, striking a remote target, like the United States, would require advanced missile delivery technology that the country did not yet possess.

From 2003 to 2005 the tense relations between Washington and Pyongyang were barely dampened by the implementation of the Six-party talks
Perception of the crisis among the Five varied from a regional shift in the balance of power to a global non-proliferation issue
The International Response: unified condemnation diminished by splintered interests
The second and third phases of the 5th round of the Six-party talks: an illustration of Pyongyang brinkmanship cycle
Pyongyang gained advantage through the division
Did the parties enter negotiations with realistic expectations?
Did the Five have enough leverage?
Since 2006 neither diplomacy nor sanctions have been able to curb Pyongyang's nuclear program. Regime change seems to be the least bad option

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[...] In order to re-engage with North Korea, the international community supported the Six-party talks: negotiations meetings between North Korea, South Korea, the United States, China, Japan and Russia. The talks aimed at a peaceful denuclearization of North Korea and a resolution of the security concerns in the area. From the first round of talks in August 2003 to the fifth round, one year before the 2006 nuclear test, little progress was made. North Korea continuously attempted to negotiate directly with the United States while sidelining South Korea. [...]

[...] The international response relied on stick-and-carrot diplomacy and did not reach its ambitions because of the deeply autarkic nature of North Korea. The Five had difficulty assessing appropriate thresholds for both incentives and deterrent. Excessive rewards would offer wherewithals and, indirectly, credibility to Kim Jong Il. Conversely, ruthless sanctions would be ineffective against a system thriving in isolation and weaken the Non Proliferation Treaty. Pyonygang's behavior during the negotiations shows that the regime believes there are alternatives to international cooperation. [...]

[...] The International Response: unified condemnation diminished by splintered interests The 2006 North Korean nuclear test was immediately condemned by the international community. The White House described it as proactive act defiance" and the United Kingdom Foreign Office warned that the international community would "respond robustly". However, while the test was a tactical success for North Korea as it prompted Washington to accept bilateral talks, it was nevertheless a strategic failure, as it isolated Pyongyang from its principal ally: China. The alienation of China gave the United States an opening for harsher sanctions, backed by Japan. [...]

[...] Humanitarian assistance and cooperation held the highest spot in South Korea's agenda. While the President's Bush administration considered Seoul gullible, China's president Hu Jintao and Russia's President Vladimir Putin feared that Washington's adamant attitude would be counterproductive and joined Roh Moo-hyun. The parties also disagreed on the timetable of the negotiations. The United States and Japan wanted Pyonygang to completely dismantle its nuclear arsenal before discussing "rewards" as they feared that North Korea would take advantage of the situation and not disarm. [...]

[...] In a following phase, started the 19th of March 2007, North Korea agreed to disable all nuclear facilities subject to September 2005 Joint Statement22 and the February 13 Agreement. The North Korean nuclear crisis seemed to have been resolved within the framework of the Six-party talks and in October 2008 the United States removed North Korea from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. However, in the end, the Five were incapable of hindering Kim Jong Il's escalation tactics. In November 2008, Pyongyang refused the visit of delegates controlling for the dismantlement of its nuclear facilities. [...]

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