The Interplay of National and European Considerations in the Foreign Policy of EU Members - The Countries Other than France and Germany

Damien T.

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The Interplay of National and European Considerations in the Foreign Policy of EU Members - The Countries Other than France and Germany

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Themes

Interplay, national consideration, European consideration, foreign policy, EU members, EU European Union, European countries, Europe-puissance, Turkey, NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Spain, Italy, Great Britain, Poland, communism, Europe, Ireland, Holland, Finland, Mediterranean Union, Nice arrangements, European Constitution, national agenda, Member States, European defense, free trade area, subprime crisis, London, economy, British military, Saint-Malo Summit, devolution, European economy, ETA terrorism, ETA Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, liberalization, liberalism, Nice Treaty, federalists, Cold War, economic slowdown

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Abstract

France and Germany alone can no longer call the tune in the EU. They henceforth have to take much more into account the agenda of the other members.
We shall see first that agenda, regrouping, of course, the different countries into larger groups along their affinities, and then the possible consequences for the future development of the EU.
At the same time, if the other countries seemed one year ago to experience fewer problems than France and Germany, it is no longer the case.

Great Britain
Spain and Italy
The Smaller Nordic Members
The New Members in Eastern Europe
Consequences for the Development of the EU

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Extract

[...] In order to restructure their economy, and to control a difficult environment to the East and the West, and also because the Italians have a strong sense of their national identity (despite much nonsense about that in France . ) they all agree, Left or Right, in wanting to retain their freedom of action and to maximize their advantages. That is why they all agree that there should be no Franco-German axis in Europe, which would relegate them to the second row, that is why there are keen to remain close to London and, at least in normal times, to Washington. [...]

[...] The Interplay of National and European Considerations in the Foreign Policy of EU Members - The Countries Other than France and Germany France and Germany alone can no longer call the tune in the EU. They have to take henceforth much more into account the agenda of the other members. We shall see first that agenda, regrouping, of course, the different countries into larger groups along their affinities, and then the possible consequences for the future development of the EU. [...]

[...] London enjoys a special status in the EU, sometimes called "à la carte": special finance arrangements (GB pays less than she should to Brussels) and London is not a member of the Euro zone or of the Schengen area (or of our beloved LMD system . For the future development of Europe London did not support the 2004 Constitution: actually, the British were quite happy that it failed in France. London prefers arrangements among Member States in the framework of the EU, but quite loose, with not every single country participating, and under interstate cooperation, not integration. [...]

[...] The French model of "Europe-puissance", resting as far as possible on interstate cooperation, starting between France and Germany and Great Britain and with a strong defense and foreign policy identity; that model now finds little sympathy elsewhere; "Europe-puissance" will enjoy less support than NATO. The core group concept. But Germany opposes it. It is too early to guess which model will carry the day. And I would tend to believe that a lot depends now on the questions of future enlargements: with Turkey, possibly the Balkans (and Ukraine?) the British concept, possibly coupled for some matters with the core group one, would seem to become the only practicable solution. [...]

[...] Because they feel it is the best way to prevent the bigger members to boss them around. They are going to refuse any core group system of the major members, they are going to be very cautious about "Europe-puissance" schemes which they see as a thinly veiled attempt at asserting French foreign policy aims, for the same reason they are going to steer a cautious course towards the US: they don't like President Bush policy, which goes against their moral values, but they did not wish to break with the US (where they have many of their previous nationals who emigrated there) nor with an Atlantic world with which they are closely linked (in a manner comparable to the UK). [...]

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