To what extent was the air campaign in operation Iraqi freedom a military success but a public relations failure?

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[...] However, Rubin highlights how the US military operations have only been able to limit units in region and whilst the US military defeated Iraqi armed forces and removed Saddam Hussein from power within three weeks; the post Iraq war situation has failed and enemy we're fighting is a bit different from the one we war-gamed against” (Rubin, p.2009 256). This reinforces the arguments of Blakesley (2005) and Jorgensen (2008) that the narrow presumptions upon which the shock and awe doctrine is based fail to consider the lateral perspective, which is clearly fundamental in contemporary military strategy To this end, it is submitted that a central reason for the American military failure in Iraq is the failure to account for the cultural, historical and social political backdrop. [...]

[...] Moreover, the Bush Administration argued that this was a key element in the alleged US “success” in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Donnelly p.52) However, whilst in the short term, the immediate effect of the shock and awe air campaign suggests that from a military perspective, the campaign was a military success; the long term ramifications not only for public relations but for US military capabilities has fuelled debate as to the extent to which Operation Iraqi Freedom can legitimately be labeled a military success (Peltz p.1) A central element of this debate is the criticism in some quarters of Ullman and Wade's assumptions of success under the shock and awe rapid dominance paradigm (Knights p.ix). [...]

[...] This will work towards implementing a contextually relevant and targeted strategy, which will avoid the pitfalls of the shock and awe assumptions, which culminated in Operation Iraqi Freedom ultimately resulting in both a military and public relations failure. Bibliography Adams, T. K. (2006). The Army after next: the first postindustrial army. Greenwood Publishing Group. Ackerman., International Law and the Pre-emptive use of force against Iraq. CRS Report for Congress. (2003) Alderson, A.(2007) Revising the British Army Counter Insurgency Doctrine. Available at www.rusi.org Accessed November Army Code 71749 Army Field Manual Volume 1 Combined Arms Operations Part 10 Avant, D. [...]

[...] and Merrit, G.S., “Reconstruction and Constitution Building in Iraq” 37 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 765 (2004). Ribbelink, O. (2008). Beyond the UN Charter: Peace, Security and the Role of Justice. Cambridge University Press. Rubin, B. (2009) Conflict and Insurgency in Contemporary Middle East. Taylor and Francis Scarhill, J. (2008) Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army. Nation Books Revised Edition, Schenider, C (2005) “Striking a Balance in Post-Conflict Constitution Making: Lessons from Afghanistan for the International Community. Peace, [...]

[...] Appurtenant to this is the clear public relations failure of Operation Iraqi Freedom as regards the US reputation abroad (Mitchell et al p.115), which I shall now consider Operation Iraqi Freedom and US Public Relations The previous section demonstrates the problems from a military strategic perspective in implementing shock and awe tactics in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Moreover, it is submitted that the long term ramifications of US military action in Operation Iraqi Freedom reflects a shift in the international political framework and a US foreign policy dictated by national interests. [...]