Constructivism and intervention: The case of Kosovo

Ana R.

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Constructivism and intervention: The case of Kosovo

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Abstract

Constructivism is one of the "newer" theories of International Relations (IR) that attempts to build bridges between the existing theories of IR, most notably neo-realism and neo-liberalism. Constructivism has its roots in the pre-World War II (WWII) Utopian era, which then intermixed with the critical social theory movements of Foucault and others alike. Since then it "has acquired considerable significance in International Relations" and as a "phenomenon has become inescapable"1. Its goal is to explain how many core aspects of IR are actually socially constructed, contrary to the beliefs held by the neo-realists and the neo-liberals who believe that its structure arises from immutable forces in human nature. It claims that international actors are embedded in a structure that is both normative and material2. This is somewhat of a departure from the previous theories that largely focused on materialist aspects only.

Introduction
Constructivism and Alexander Wendt
Constructivist theory
A state's identity
Importance of communication and the distribution of knowledge among actors
The recent study of modern intervention
Kosovo's historical and religious significance to the Serbian nation
The war in Bosnia
The humanitarian crisis in Kosovo
Serbia's identity in the world
Anti-Albanian campaigns and Milosevic's misperceptions of NATO
Conclusion
Bibliography

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[...] Cambridge Barnett, Michael, and Finnemore, Martha. Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations”. International Organization. Volume 53, Issue 4. Pages 699-+. Fall Bellamy, Alex J. “Humanitarian responsibilities and interventionist claims in international society”. Review of International Studies. Volume 29, Issue 3. pages 321-340. July Bellamy, Alex J. “Kosovo and International Society”. Palgrave Macmillan. Basingstoke, Hampshire Bellamy, Alex J., and Williams, Paul, eds. “Peace Operations and Global Order”. Routledge, New York, NY Finnemore, Martha. Purpose of Intervention”. Cornell University Press. Ithaca and London Finnemore, Martha. [...]

[...] The author makes it clear that “social purpose (interest) can change only through a combination of agent action and structural transformation”13. Perhaps the most recent study of intervention that can be taken into account is the intervention into Kosovo by the United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces. This is a very interesting case that can show the inter-subjective nature of identity between states and other institutions. The reasons for intervention, or how these reasons are perceived, as well as its consequences, for both sides, are very important in this field of study. [...]

[...] Under the rule of Josip Broz Tito, the president of Yugoslavia, Kosovo along with Vojvodina enjoyed the status an autonomous region within the Republic of Serbia in 1945, and reached the status of province in the 1970s when it received an expanded set of rights. With Tito's death in 1980 and the beginnings of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, Kosovo fell deeper into turmoil. The 1980s saw an increase in numbers of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, and with it a rise of Albanian nationalism that led to an exodus of sorts of ethnic Serbs from the area. [...]

[...] Supporters of the government or not, the majority of Serbs viewed and still views the territory of Kosovo as rightfully and historically theirs, the seat of kings and the holiest place in Serbian Orthodoxy. The American support for the independence of Kosovo was seen as unilateral use of force by one imperialist nation against a weaker one, impinging on every principle of national sovereignty; Serbia, after all, was only trying to keep hold of its territory (in their view). Because of its deadly anti-Albanian campaigns and Milosevic's misperceptions of NATO threats as well as his unwillingness to give into coercive diplomacy, Serbian identity suffered much damage post NATO intervention. [...]

[...] It would be interesting to delve into further research on the specific communication breakdowns within the process and what, if anything could have been done to ensure greater communication, and thereby greater understanding of the actors' identities. Even after researching the topic I'm really not sure if increased communication levels would have helped the situation at all. Milosevic was clearly willing to take a lot, although not anything it took, from NATO because for a decade prior to the intervention their threats simply turned up empty. [...]

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