Vladimir Putin's Russia is no longer the towering superpower it had been twenty years ago, and its influence and military might are considerably less of a force in global politics. But, thanks to a huge and poorly maintained nuclear arms force, the growing instability in the Caucasus, Central Asia and Crimea, and the Russian political scene's disturbing resemblance to Weimar Germany, the country arguably constitutes one of the gravest threat to international security today. These threats have been, and will be further exacerbated by the continuation of insensitive and unilateral US/NATO expansionist policies into Russia's historic spheres of influence, policies that are easily perceived as confrontational and increasingly putting Putin on the defensive.
[...] Normalizing relations is also the first step towards peaceful nuclear disarmament. Russia will not give up its most strategically significant weapons if it feels under threat, and these weapons must be neutralized while we still know where they are. To mitigate the risks a collapse of the economy could hold towards successful disarmament, establish agreements on cooperative funding of poorly resourced nuclear sites (e.g. already entire regiments of soldiers stationed at nuclear bunkers have gone months without being paid) and if possible establish an independent agency to monitor and assign funding to Russian nuclear facilities. [...]
[...] If NATO makes a more concerted effort to engage Russia diplomatically the two could come to mutual defense agreements so that one or the other is not caught of guard by further military changes (such as the new ABMs to be installed in Central Europe had dialogue been engaged beforehand, and like ABMs set up to protect Russia, any diplomatic problems could have been avoided) and power-sharing agreements in highly contested countries could be negotiated. Meanwhile, if its oil and gas exports continue to finance its economic growth, Russia could continue to establish its new place in the world order with a degree of predictability. [...]
[...] are not convinced that the West holds the answers: according to a recent poll only 16% of Russians want to see Western Democracy installed in their country, while 26% think Putin's quasi-authoritarian system is more suitable and 35% would even like to return to the Communist system. The respondents to this poll consider the Yeltsin period the darkest in recent Russian history [“Russia's Deep Animosity,” Pfaff, William, International Herald Tribune, 3/5/2007]. Vladimir Putin's presidency, on the other hand, has been characterized by an apparent turn-around: significant economic recovery (based on high world market prices of oil and natural gas, of which Russia controls a large stockpile) and a partial resurgence of Russia's international clout. [...]
[...] In effect this would resemble a cold war-type situation (competing powers waging an indirect struggle for influence) played out directly on Russia's doorstep instead of in a faraway third tier conflict, and could thusly be far less predictable. The other linchpin in Russian stability is the continued success of its economy, which hinges on the high world market prices of its gas and oil exports. Were these prices to plummet Russia's export-led growth would slow and the country would scramble for other options. [...]
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