The CSCE (Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe) was born with the Helsinki final act in 1975, as the territorial statu quo seemed definitely taken for granted by both the communist block and western countries. On the 1st of August 1975, 35 heads of states from Europe, the US and Canada signed the Final Helsinki Act (or the Helsinki accords), a political, non-binding agreement. It can be traced back to the 1950s when the Soviet Union began to devote to a desire to have a kind of 'post second World War peace conference'. The CSCE was first of all a conference that would undermine the cohesion of the Western alliance by bringing it to a common table with totalitarian countries in order to achieve a certain consensus and, even more importantly, would lead to the division of Germany and the borders of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe. The CSCE was only a conference and has been institutionalized subsequently, by a series of follow-up meetings, which monitored the implementation of the Final Act and became practically the only mechanism ensuring the vitality of the process.
[...] Indeed, it plans annual exchange of information on military forces, weapon system and significant military assets, and military budget (which were rejected so far by the USSR lest NATO interferes in its defense secrets). A second section, on “risks reduction” aims at easing the cooperation in case of “unusual military activities” or “dangerous incident that concern army”. Finally, a third section plans visits of air force bases that had not been included in the trust measures before. These decisions are important for the definition of the new OSCE for two reasons, first, they settled a “network of rapid communication” (Summit of Paris, the Vienna document, Section IX) and an “annual meeting of evaluation” (op. [...]
[...] They blame the OSCE for furthering the ideological, financing and logistic electoral revolutions often called “revolution of colors” such as the “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine, in 2004. This position has widely slowed the dialogue within the OSCE member-states. More generally, these critics are against the partiality of OSCE decisions, which are then seen as the power of states” on “vulnerable states” in which they interfere. These positions can be seen as remains of the Cold War, when Ukraine or Caucasian countries were still part of the USSR. [...]
[...] Only NATO and the Russian Army can insure the security in the region. Furthermore, the organization seems to have shown incapability to prevent from armed conflicts in Central Asia and in Balkans. They consider that the role of the OSCE is more a political role (in the stricter mean of the word) than a military role, and that it does not actually have the capacity to take care of the European security. I will try to explain why is the OSCE an actual power in Europe, and how its decisions are settled as for conflict preventions, but also peace- keeping operations. [...]
[...] (56 member states).It gives it a role in Europe that can supply the feedbacks of both the EU and NATO. What is more, if OSCE has been for a long time the place where the two blocs could gather and debate about the future of Europe in regards of the Cold War stake, it is now officially facing the post-cold war issues. Arms traffic, organized crime, terrorism and economic disparity threaten the security and the peace of the continent. II. [...]
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