The immediate cause of Charles de Gaulle's resumption of power (1958-1969) was the Algerian War, which had brought France to the brink of civil war and destroyed the Fourth Republic. By ending the war, de Gaulle had the chance to resurrect his proposal, first elaborated at Bayeux in 1946, of a republic under strong presidential leadership. The Fifth's Republic regime was designed to maximize executive dominance in foreign-policy-making. All key foreign-policy decisions of the Gaullist era, including Algeria, nuclear weapons development, withdrawal from NATO, important Common Market matters, and foreign interventions, took place with virtually no prior parliamentary debate and as a direct consequence of the General's vision. De Gaulle's conception of international relations and of France's global role heavily influenced France's foreign policy during and after his tenure in office. This study examines key parts of French global policy under the administration of President Charles de Gaulle. Within the framework of specific French strategic, economic, and diplomatic policy areas, it reviews some of the steps taken to revise international relations, from the point of view of France's bilateral relations with other states and international organizations.
[...] De Gaulle's conception of Europe was essentially that of a confederation of nations determining together a common policy a confederation in which French influence would therefore operate not merely through France (too small a power at global level), but through the intermediary of a politically united Europe which would have enough weight to influence world events, enabling France to reserve its global influence. It was clear that what really mattered for de Gaulle was not economics but the construction of a political Europe. [...]
[...] His language was even more direct in Romania, which he visited in may 1968 (at the height of the student crisis in Paris) and where he energically denounced the subjection of the many countries that, “divided up between two opposing blocs, are subject to a political, economic and military direction from outside, and endure the permanent presence of foreign troops on their territory”. France's global policy often appeared to be clothed in anti-Americanism, given that the US dominated the bloc that most directly threatened the French desire for independence. [...]
[...] In 1968 began the period of turbulence which was to threaten de Gaulle's Republic from within and result in the abandonment of the great global vision shortly before de Gaulle's departure from power.[35] Conclusion France counted for very little in a world that was ever more completely regulated by the dialogue, or the conflict, between the United States and the Soviet Union. Only a pluralistic international system, encouraging larger bilateral ties between states in all their spheres of activity, could advance Gaullist aspirations on behalf of France for increased global influence, enhanced international status, and national glory. [...]
[...] In addition de Gaulle imposed a non-written custom which consisted of making foreign policy the “domaine réservé du président de la République”. Hauss p.86 De Gaulle spoke passionately of France's destiny; "Toute ma vie, je me suis fait une certaine idée de la France. Le sentiment me l'inspire aussi bien que la raison. Ce qu'il y a en moi, d'affectif imagine naturellement la France, telle la princesse des contes ou la madone aux fresques des murs, comme vouée à une destinée imminente et exceptionnelle [ ] le côté positif de mon esprit me convainc que la France n'est réellement elle-même qu'au premier rang [ ] Bref, à mon sens, la France ne peut être la France sans la grandeur." Cerny p.18 The French journalist André Fontaine well described de Gaulle's attitude: "Ideologies are . [...]
[...] The weapons of grandeur: the nuclear imperative De Gaulle's policy of national independence and his burning ambition to count for something in global politics made it essential for him to possess nuclear weapons, the core element of any international strategy. On 13 February 1960 the first French atomic bomb exploded at Reggane, and de Gaulle telegraphed his army minister: “Hurrah for France. As from this morning she is stronger and prouder.” France was from now on a member of the closed circle of nuclear powers. [...]
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