The European Union (EU) is a newcomer in the business of peace support operations. Of course, its members have long been involved in almost any sort of non-Article 5 (NATO/WEU) mission in the past, and they still are today. But they have usually done so under other flags than the EU one. Even if the idea of a European defence has always been vivid since the beginning e.g the failure of the European Community of Defence (1954), it has become a reality only recently.
The ambition and the commitment to engage the EU as such in crisis management operations, in fact, were first formulated at the Cologne European Council of June 1999, which marked the beginning of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The EU has since then built institutions and implemented mechanisms for an effective ESDP .
Even though, until 2003 the ESDP has remained mainly a rhetorical politic. The EU has mainly favoured a pragmatic approach based on the pooling of capacities, often on an ad hoc basis, rather than on juridical texts. The military operations are important test cases for the Union's ability to apply some of the security policy instruments it envisaged under the 1999 Helsinki Headline Goal. So they represent a major breakthrough for ESDP because for the first time the Union is proactively engaging in security affairs covering a variety of tasks that stretch from policing to military intervention. 2003 marked the moment when the EU has tested its capacities, going into practice.
[...] In April he froze the bank accounts and forbade travels abroad to about twenty people. However, these powers look likely to be abandoned with the improvement of the situation in the country. The importance of the role of the EUSR is the result of some lessons learned from EU fragmentation of action in the field in BiH and in respect to lessons learned between NATO's SFOR and EU-NATO civilian-military relations in the field. He is charged with: ensuring that EUFOR takes his political advice and directives into consideration; coordinating the EUPM and EUMM; holding regular meetings with other EU representatives like the Commission Delegation or the EU Presidency; coordinating all EU policy reporting from BiH and speaking on behalf of the EU in BiH. [...]
[...] Indeed, the integration to European and Euro-Atlantic institutions is supported by the international community. In the EU, the emphasis is put on the “historical responsibility”[36] of Europeans towards the Balkan people doomed to “europeanisation”[37]. The people and authorities of BiH are invited to continue their “journey towards the to join the “European standards” so as to integrate the “European family”. However, EU officials prefer the term “European integration” rather than “accession”, which reveals that it is not an irreversible process and maybe that accession is not the only way to be integrated. [...]
[...] Other tasks are the fight against terrorism, the arrest of indictees of war crimes and intelligence services. It can be reasonably assessed that NATO didn't want to let the EU arrest the indictees in its place and been granted with international recognition so it insisted to keep a role in the hunting of war criminals What is more, the USA as well has maintained a residual presence there of about 250 people, in Tuzla, officially to serve as formation centre for other operations. [...]
[...] Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina: the european security and defence policy (esdp) coming of age? INDEX PREFACE INTRODUCTION: Why BiH[1], why now? I. A MAINLY POLITICAL MISSION: “FROM THE DAYTON TO THE BRUSSEL A. the hearts and minds of the Bosnians”[3] B. A seamless transition from NATO to EU: proof of continuity C. Broader project of European and Euro-Atlantic integration through Partnership for Peace (PfP) and Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) II. THE CHALLENGES AHEAD A. Internal coherence - Union of all EU instruments of external relations in an integrated way - The uneasy role of Lord Ashdown as EU Special Representative B. [...]
[...] The EU regularly insists on the need for commitment on both sides. In 2003, the European Commission accepted to launch a Feasibility Study to evaluate the willingness of BiH to accomplish first steps towards European integration. The response was a with no less than 16 reforms to undertake. As for NATO, the from the Alliance in 2004[41] had a negative effect and had consequences on the decision of the EU. Entry in the PfP implies the reform of defence and full co-operation with the ICTY. [...]
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