My purpose here is not to draw the historical background of the Western Sahara conflict (as it has already been done) but to give some insights on how to prevent another war in the unstable area of Maghreb. The Western Sahara is known to be the last colony of the world that has existed in spite of the decolonization process that has not yet come to an end. Instead of granting the right to self-determination to the Sahrawis, Spain gave its share- "Spanish Sahara" to Morocco in 1975. Consequently, Morocco had to fight a strong guerrilla between 1975 and 1991 in order to keep control of this territory. However in 1991, the U.N. obtained a cease-fire that had been respected so far (with some minor violations in 1994) and since then efforts were made to organize a fair self-determination referendum. In 1997, Kofi Annan appointed James Baker as the "Special representative of the Secretary General for the Western Sahara". He obtained from the parties (Moroccan and Sahrawis) an agreement (Houston agreements) that encompassed a certain "code of conduct" governing a referendum that would decide the fate of the territory. The main bone of contention in the former concentrated on the identification of the future voters. The Moroccan government tried its best to insert into the list some Moroccan tribes in order to trick the result of the referendum. However, the MINURSO (UN mission in Western Sahara) had already established a definitive list (86500 voters) in January 2000, but also had set up an appeal procedure that could be used by 50000 Moroccan people and was referred to as the next phase. In order to analyze the current situation of the issue and propose new ideas which could act as useful components of a future resolution process, I adopted certain concepts from some conflict analysis theories and applied them where ever relevant. My purpose here is not to take only one theoretical framework an apply it to resolve an issue. On the contrary, it is to request for the assistance of some scholars on different theoretical notions in order to analyze the conflict issues that occur in reality better. "The landscape of war differed so much from case to case that I despaired to find a reliable road map" said John Stoessinger. I would say that the Sahrawi case is so complex that I despaired to apply one reliable road map. I was tempted to adopt the precept of the Frankfort School i.e. the link between ICA and reality (social, facts) in some cases are more essential than the link between ICA and theories in order to understand and deal with a conflict. It is quintessential to determine the type of conflict we face (I) in order to draw a method of resolution (II) and then make proposals to prevent another war (III).
[...] We could find maybe six periods: first, it was an issue between Spain and Sahrawis (before 1975), secondly, it became a trio with the negotiations between Spain, Mauritania and Morocco (1975), thirdly, it was a trio with the war between Polisario and Morocco and Mauritania (which resigned quickly), fourthly, the Morocco refused to accept the existence of Sahrawis and only allowed negotiations with its enemy: Algeria; fifthly, Morocco recognized the Sahrawis as a party (1996-97). We could maybe see a sixth possibility, more and more argued by the Sahrawis: the conflict is now only between Morocco and the MINURSO (or the UN). [...]
[...] It is necessary to determine the type of conflict we face in order to draw a method of resolution and then make proposals to prevent another war (III). I. What type of conflict? The Western Sahara conflict is the last decolonization based conflict. It opposes now Morocco to the Sahrawis, i.e., the Sahrawi's Arab Democratic Republic (SADR, political body) and the Frente Popular para la Liberación del Saguia el-Hamra y Rio de Oro (POLISARIO, military body), which actually are composed by the same people. [...]
[...] It is a matter of self- determination, a right the Sahrawis have never been granted to implement. Both sides of the conflict are very inflexible. We are in a situation called by Seyom Brown as “nonnegotiable demands”: country represents its demands as non-negotiable and in need of urgent fulfilment but its opponents find them unacceptable”. The demand of the Sahrawis is independence through a fair self-determination referendum. They often have emphasized that this demand is non-negotiable, and if it were definitely not reachable by peaceful means, they would not hesitate to rise up in arms once again. [...]
[...] Direct negotiations seem to be definitely impossible. James Baker III was the first to succeed in organizing direct meetings between Moroccan and Sahrawis officials: mediation. It worked, to a certain extent, since they reached an agreement (Houston agreement 1997). But the implementation remains in the hands of the governments. Jurisdictional means is impossible because, first of all, the SADR is not a state and therefore cannot refer to the International Court of Justice. The latter have moreover already given an Advisory Opinion in 1975 on the demand of the UN General Assembly. [...]
[...] To convince them, it is a necessity to prepare very seriously the pre- and post-referendum period in order to guarantee a durable stability. When Morocco would not be able to rely on its European allies (only about this particular file, of course), it would not be in its interest to go on with its status-quo politics. Another idea is the preparation of the post-referendum phase. Since it is the most plausible result of the referendum, I will propose my suggestion on the basis of the birth of a new North-African state. [...]
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