The Dayton Peace agreement

Extract

[...] Furthermore, parties agreed on human rights and migration-related issues. The second document produced for the settlement (‘Further agreed basic principles') advocated for the organisation of central Bosnian power, envisaging a shared presidency, a parliament and a constitutional court. The emphasis put on national institutions obviously aimed at smoothing further negotiation, but also at shutting down any rumours of a possible partition. The next step was to bring all parties to a ceasefire, in order to start the ‘real' negotiations; but if Milošev&i agreed to stop the fighting and had been advocating for the ceasefire for weeks, the other actors, and mainly A. [...]

[...] Council on Foreign Relations - Achieving peace or protecting human rights? Conflicts between norms regarding ethnic discrimination in the Dayton Peace agreement, Gro Nystuen, The Raoul Wallenberg Institute Human Rights Library Volume - The Road to the Dayton Accords. A study of American statecraft, Derek Chollet, Palgrave McMillan - David Harland, ‘Never again: International intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina', for the ‘UK Government Stabilisation Unit project relating to elite bargains and political deals, “ - Bosnian Security after Dayton, éd. Michael A. [...]

[...] The main parties at war: HVO, ARBiH, VRS. Following its declaration of independence in 1992, Bosnia Herzegovina sees part of its Bosno-Serb minority take arms under the leadership of Radovan Kara&d&i and his Army of Republika Srpska, that seeks unification with the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (‘The Decision on Proclamation of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina". V&eernje novosti (in Serbian) April 1992.) Thus starts the Bosnian war, with the Vojska Republike Srpske opposed to the independence of Bosnia, fighting against other ethnically aligned groups: the ARBiH (Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina - Armija Republike Bosne i Hercegovine) and the HVO -Croatian Defence Council (Hrvatsko vij&ee obrane). [...]

[...] Betts, "The Delusion of Impartial Intervention'. Furthermore, the Clinton administration confirmed in late 1994 an earlier presidential decision, agreeing to the use of US troops in NATO's Op-plan 40,104 should UNOPROFOR's situation become chaotic. After the Srebrenica massacre and the hostage situation involving peacekeepers, NATO military planners began working on the plan, which called for using 20,000 U.S. troops as part of a 60,000-person evacuation force. This development and the implications it had for the US Army seem to have been a surprise to most of the State Department and the President himself. [...]

[...] In 1995, the year of the Dayton agreement, we then have a politically fragile federation facing the VRS, with the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) charged to protect designed ‘safe areas' and ensure civilian safety and humanitarian support. Over the course of the year, the federation gradually takes advantage over the VRS, conducting multiple joint offensives (operations Summer, Mistral, Sana ) and reclaiming most of Western Bosnia. With such territorial loss, pressure from NATO bombings and Belgrade, the Bosno-Serbs lose all initiative in the conflict. But in order to reach a full understanding of the war situation, one must not only discuss the ground actors main positions, but also the different foreign interests at play. [...]