European defense, European Constitution of 2005, European defense system, EU European Union, WEU Western European Union, Brussels Treaty of 1948, military alliance, GB Great Britain, France, Benelux countries, 1954, NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization, European security, European army, EDC European Defence Community, EDA European Defence Agency, OCCAR Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière d'ARmement, organization for cooperation in armaments matters, defense assets, Petersberg missions, French military, Fouchet Plan, 1961, foreign and defense policy, foreign policy, defense policy, Ministers of Defence, MC Military Committee, Berlin Conference of June 1996, CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy, Iraqi crisis of 2003, Lisbon Treaty, peacekeeping, European Council, SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, interstate system, European partners, Washington, Warsaw, the United States of America, European armament firms, armament, Prague, American policies, Europe security
The problem of a European defense system is not new: we remember the Brussels Treaty of 1948, which was a military alliance between GB, France and the Benelux countries, including a common European general staff which was stationed in Fontainebleau, until it was taken over by NATO in 1951, but the alliance included in the Brussels Treaty subsisted. It became in 1954 the Western European Union. The WEU never played an important role (all its members, apart from France, preferred NATO to play the first role in European security) but it survived until quite recently with a small organization and a parliamentary assembly and a Strategic Institute which does useful work to study the problems of European defense. At times, it was suggested to build up upon the WEU a true European defense system. Those plans though never matured and the WEU disappeared during the period of preparation for the European Constitution, which was supposed to take over some of its functions.
[...] The absence of it before was rather strange for such an ambitious political project The existing military organization was not really modified by the projected constitution or by the Lisbon Treaty, apart from the creation of a European Defence Agency, replacing a first organization for cooperation in armaments matters, OCCAR. But the Agency has been created in 2004 anyway. The European Defense Assets Today There is a small organization under the representative for European foreign and security policy, Javer Solana, which can study security problems, in cooperation with the national intelligence services, and help prepare decisions for the European Council. There is a satellite imagery center of the EU in Torrejon, in Spain. [...]
[...] Towards a European Defense? Introduction The problem of a European defense system is not new: we remember the Brussels Treaty of 1948, which was a military alliance between GB, France and the Benelux countries, including a common European general staff which was stationed in Fontainebleau, until it was taken over by NATO in 1951, but the alliance included in the Brussels Treaty subsisted. It became in 1954 the Western European Union (with the accession to the original Five of Germany and Italy). [...]
[...] It remained anyway in the non-integrated part of the Maastricht Treaty; thus, it relied on interstate cooperation: one member could always block the others, and the decision-making process was cumbersome. But the Iraqi crisis of 2003 relaunched the debate. The French and the Germans, who now agreed to try to diminish European dependence on the US, suggested in April 2003 to form an operational staff for the EU (not just a planning staff as the one which had been created in 1999) outside NATO. [...]
[...] But Blair had his own agenda: he stated he wanted to suppress the WEU, probably because since the 80s the French had wanted to develop it as a European alternative to NATO. The British certainly wanted to develop a European security identity, but firmly embedded in NATO, and allowing GB to play a major role as an intermediary between the US and the EU in strategic matters, thus making full use of the influence provided by the important British military establishment (the only one in Europe able to operate really with American forces). [...]
[...] Industrial and economic logic runs against the European defense identity. Conclusion For the time being the Europeans have developed efficient means for keeping or restoring peace, with an active diplomacy in that field. They are now better at it than the Americans. But now they don't have the means for major operations outside NATO: there is still now true European defense identity. There is a risk of "dishwashing", as they say, for the US: the US does the quick military intervention, the Europeans come afterwards for the long, painful process of restoring peace, supporting the populations, and so on (as in the Balkans). [...]
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