Beginning with a certain turnover, the EU merger rules are to be applied to cross-border concentrations, irrespective of the size of the company or area of their activity. A pre-merger notification to the European Commission is obligatory. Most cases are closed by the completion of the phase I, which lasts approximately six weeks. Only a small percentage (5%) passes into phase II, which means another four months time of investigation. The final decision is then subject to juridical review by the Court of First Instance (CFI) and European Court of Justice. At the beginning of the new millennium high-profile cases have called attention to the differences in approach between the competition authorities. On 16 February 2001, the Commission received a notification of a merger plan of Schneider Electrics which wanted to acquire Legrand by way of an exchange of shares announced on 15 January 2001. The offer involves a concentration of all the shares of Legrand, and according to the Merger Regulation that demonstrates an acquisition of control.
[...] Moreover some critics also state that “inadequate checks on the Commission's fiercely independent task force have fostered an arrogant, trigger- happy culture that has encouraged over-zealous officials to forge ahead without due regard for the facts and proper procedures.”[7] 6 Impact of the case on the Mario Monti's approach and on the merger regulation The developments during Mario Monti's legacy provoked criticism, especially with regard to more bureaucratic approach caused by increased number of notifications and detail of investigation. During these years, the EC took a series of controversial decisions (including eight prohibition decisions) and suffered a series of defeats at the courts (CFI's judgements in Airtours, Schneider and Tetra Laval). [...]
[...] A central part of this competition, since 1990, is merger control, presided over by the then commissioner Mario Monti and his Merger Task Force (MTF). One could say that governments have a dichotomous relationship with competition; on the one hand they wish to stimulate the growth of businesses both in numbers and in size. However, on the other hand, those same firms must not be allowed to become large”, says the same government. In other words, a firm must not attain such a size or position, with which it would obtain a dominant position in its market. [...]
[...] Graph Horizontal merger case 3 Conclusion As shown by the statistics, the number of mergers blocked by the European Commission is very low. It is, in other words, quite rare for a merger not to be given the green light. The fact that a large number of cases progress to the second phase of the investigations shows that the Commission studies all cases thoroughly, as it should, and then only on seldom occasions blocks them. Nevertheless, it has been suggested that the Commission should take a more positive approach and really exhaust all the possible routes to bring about a promising solution for all parties involved. [...]
[...] Commission concluded that there are concerns regarding the scope of the Merger Regulations and had serious doubts about this merger. The merger of these two companies would have affected many of the business segments in which they are active. However, primarily in the low-voltage electrical equipment sector, where Legrand is active and a huge part of Schneider's business existe. More specifically, the merger would have had an impact on three business categories: Low- voltage switchboards, cable-trays and busbar trunking and electrical equipment downstream of the final panelboard. [...]
[...] Mario Monti's Legacy in EC Merger Control. Competition Policy International. Vol Nr pp. 1-35. - Voigt, S. and Schmidt, A. (2004). The Commission's guidelines on merger control: improvement or deterioration?. Common Market Law Review, Vol.41, Nr pp. 1583-1595. - Völcker, S.B. (2004). Developments in EC Competition law in 2003: an overview. Common Market Law Review, Vol Nr pp.1027-1072. - Roller, L.H. (n.d.). European Policy Perspectives: Economic analysis and competition policy enforcement in Europe. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/nma.pdf Levy, N. (2005). Mario Monti's Legacy in EC Merger Control. [...]
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