Why has the European Court of Justice been so central to the process of integration?

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Why has the European Court of Justice been so central to the process of integration?

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Abstract

“Law is often still treated as if it were a separate field, clearly distinct from the economic or political spheres” . As the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has never been given a lot of media coverage, most of the time, its role in the integration process is either disregarded or ignored. Although the first judges and advocates general of the institution had set its original rules by March 1953, interests in the Court's political contribution began to arise in the early 1990s, i.e. some forty years later. What role has it played in the integration process? “Of all Community institutions, the Court has gone furthest in limiting national autonomy, by asserting the principles of superiority of Community law and of the obligation of Member States to implement building acts consistent with Community directives”
Keohane and Hoffmann, 1991 In parallel, European integration is described by Haas as the process “whereby political actors in several, distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new centre, whose institutions process or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states”. In order to complete the syllogism, one could say that “limiting national autonomy” in Keohane and Hoffmann's terms – i.e. in late intergovernmentalist theory – equals “shifting their loyalties” and “demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states” in Haas' terms, i.e. in the neofunctionalist theory. Now that we have our two premises and our middle term, the conclusion can be deduced: the ECJ is the institution which has done the most towards the European integration process.

Introduction.
1951-1965: The solid foundations of the ECJ.
1. The European Community a legal entity.
2. The Treaties of Paris and Rome empowering the ECJ.
3. The judges' expansive methods.
1965-1986: The ECJ as the driving force behind integration.
1. The ECJ at variance with initial technical conception.
2. Law as a 'mask' and a 'shield' for a 'set of political objectives'.
3. Extending the scope of the individual rights in EC law.
1986-2005: A defensive and more cautious case law.
1. The principle of mutual recognition and unwanted attention.
2. Moderate 'spill-over' effects and defence of its area of competence.
3. Increasing criticism of the ECJ.
Conclusion.
Bibliography.

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[...] Thanks to the ECJ, the European integration process had just passed an important milestone: it revealed the will to “reach out to the individual” expressed in the Treaty through the creation of the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee[29]. The corresponding critique is that the ECJ could have left the role of defender of the individual's rights to these institutions. A judicial organ is not supposed to take political steps, especially steps of such significance as direct effect and supremacy. [...]

[...] Conclusion To sum up, the ECJ has been central to the integration process first because it has had a great potential by definition, by essence, as a Court in charge of interpreting the fundamental Treaties. The judges turned these texts into a constitution to some extent and thus became a sort of Supreme Court, a wise adviser endowed with legal legitimacy. In the last statement, the Court was central in the sense that it was on top of the legal pyramid. [...]

[...] 1986-2005: a defensive and more cautious case law permitted the European Court of justice to remain a key actor in the integration process The principle of ‘mutual recognition', formulated by the Commission but inspired by an ECJ decision (Cassis de Dijon), brought attention to the institution's harmonising competence Nowadays, lawyers talk about principle Cassis de Dijon”, the case has been set up as a principle. The judgment of the 20th of February 1979: “confirmed that any product legally manufactured and marketed in one of the member states can be sold in any other member state. [...]

[...] That's why, in order to trace back the origins of the ECJ's powers, one has to examine the Treaties which created it, gave it competences and confirmed its organisation, i.e. the ECSC Treaty of Paris (18th April 1951) and the Treaty of Rome (25th March 1957). “Under article 31 of the Treaty [of Paris], the Court was given the general task of ensuring ‘that in the interpretation and application of this Treaty, and for rules laid down for the implementation thereof, the law is observed'. [...]

[...] “Drawing on the Court's remarks, the Commission developed a general principle of mutual recognition: for member states to implement the principle of functional equivalence delineated by the Court, it was not sufficient that they treated imported products in line with national law; rather they had to take into account legitimate requirements of other member states'”[40] One can easily understand why states were upset by that suggestion. Although the Commission went “beyond the ECJ's declarations”[41], the angry reaction of member states towards the Commission affected their perception of the role of the ECJ. [...]

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