On 13th October 2005 was launched the Commission's “Plan D” for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate, which intends to “lay the foundations for the profound debate about Europe's future” in order to “mak[e] the European Union more democratic” . This strategy is a reply to the appeal for “a broad debate” made during the European council of June 2005, which took place in a context of ‘shock', after the French and the Dutch negative referenda. These “no” have been considered to some extent to stem from the European democratic deficit and the remoteness of the European Union (EU) from its citizens.
This issue has been regularly highlighted since the 1970s. It has been frequently referred to as a “parliamentary deficit” and many attempts have been made to address this paradoxical situation : direct election of the European Parliament (EP) in 1979, steady increases in the EP's powers, endeavors to set up a dialogue with European citizens, etc. Nevertheless, the democratic deficit appears severely rooted. But is it a sufficient reason to acknowledge that the European Union will never be fully democratic?
In order to answer this question, we will first examine the meaning of “democracy” and thus the alleged European “democratic deficit”. We will then come up with a solution for the EU to overcome this deficit.
Our modern societies emphasize respect for the concept of “democracy”. However, this ideal doesn't refer to a clearly defined idea, as it has been given different meanings throughout History. Etymologically, for instance, it means ‘the people's power' and it expressly refers to the direct democracy exercised in the Greek city-states. In our contemporary conception, the power is still thought as stemming from the people but delegated to representatives who take decisions on citizens' behalf – since it is concretely impossible to apply a system of direct democracy in our vast and populous states. This principle of delegation is attached to few other elements such as conditionality which supposes that “politicians are under a structural imperative to deliver to the electorate and to communicate their achievements”.
But it also presumes the equality of every citizen and the existence of a formal Parliament. These four elements are necessary to a representative democracy which constitutes the current “standard of legitimacy”. The fulfilment of these criteria would thus attest the democratic nature of a state.
[...] Firstly, it can be observed in the participation rates at the election to the European Parliament: they are becoming weaker[14], witnessing a common feeling that “decisions [are] taken far away from those directly affected”.[15] Moreover, there is a discrepancy between the programs on which members of European Parliament are elected and which often rely on national issue and the issues tackled by the Parliament in Strasbourg.[16] And, although the EP tries to establish a European assembly by creating European political parties, these supranational political parties are reduced to bring together people speaking different languages and hailing from different states. [...]
[...] Magnette, op.cit., note p The Member States have clearly understood the point, since they never miss an opportunity to use the EU as a scapegoat: every single internal problem is due to a decision taken by the “faceless technocrats”(e.g. Tsoukalis, op.cit., note 15, p.208) working at the Commission. e.g. Majone, op.cit., note 10, p.5. Redistributive policies are defined as “designed to improve the welfare of one particular group in the society at the expend of other groups”, whereas efficiency-oriented policy “attempt to increase the aggregate welfare of society [and ] are basically legitimated by the results”. [...]
[...] Commission of the European Communities, European Governance, a white paper, op. cit, note 33, p.3. e.g. Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and social committee, and the committee of the regions, The commission's contribution to the period of reflection and beyond: Plan-D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate, op.cit., note p.2. Ibid. p Irina Michalowitz, Analysing structured paths of lobbying behaviour, why discussing the involvement of the ‘civil society' doesn't solve the EU's democratic deficit, in: European integration, Vol No2, June 2004, p.151. [...]
[...] Moreover, a certain “depolitization of European policy-making”[29] can be observed, leading to a situation where the EU is granted technical questions whereas the member states retains politics-oriented questions. Also if one follows Majone's distinction between “redistributive” and “efficiency-oriented” policies[30], one can easily conclude that the policies driven by the EU are mainly efficiency-oriented, while member states deal more often with redistributive policies especially since the birth of the concept of social model. This is why, the legitimacy of EU's policies could mainly stem from their concrete results.[31] One cannot expect every citizen to understand and give a rational argumentation on very peculiar and specific points about technical matters. [...]
[...] Giandomenico Majone, ‘Europe's democratic deficit: the question of standards', in: European Law Journal, Vol No1, March 1998, p.5. It is true that the direct elections were not the rule until 1979 and that this parliament had the name of Assembly, being merely consultative. As we have seen it, conditionality presumes that “politicians are under a structural imperative to deliver to the electorate and to communicate their achievements” (e.g., Crum, op.cit., note p. 455) and accountability supposes that a person or an institution is liable. [...]
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