The problem of theodicy and what the appropriate response to said problem is an issue that torments theologians. I will argue that the most suitable response to this problem is in Metz's efforts in straying from the standard approach by admitting that theology cannot solve the theodicy problem, and rather, find a response that is based on anamnestic reason; reason endowed with memory , and memoria passionis, and is not "faceless." Metz's approach is also useful as it can be applied to all situations, to the past present and future, something that can not be said about Bonhoeffer's approach. I will analyze Hume's definition of suffering and the response's by both Leibniz and Augustine in order to show the weak foundations of their arguments.
[...] Metz understands that theology cannot solve the theodicy problem and therefore disregards Hume's approach because Hume believes he has the answer, when in fact, theology has no answer. Leibniz responded to Hume with an approach that said this is the Best of All Possible Worlds. God is omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenovelent, so he explored all possible worlds and with his infinite knowledge he decided that this is the best possible world. I reject this response because it does not really answer any question; it simply states that evil happens because this is the world God chose for us. [...]
[...] Bonhoeffer and Metz both are concerned that Christian theology focuses on things of this world and not on forms of thought that are abstract and fail to deal with concrete history. Bonhoeffer was concerned with following the “will of in decisions you make everyday. By following the will of God, when a particular situation arises, the idea is you decide what to do based on what you think God would say. In this way, Bonhoeffer's approach deals with only the here and now, it lacks the ability to impact the future. [...]
[...] passionis, the memory of someone else's suffering[4] and anamnestic reason is Metz's technique for remembering Christ, is thought as memory, as historical remembrancing.”[5] Taking these two concepts together, Metz is endorsing a theology in which we do theology after Auschwitz by facing the Jews, not Judaism but the Jews. Metz believes that theology can not go on without first acknowledging the horrors of the Holocaust and then creating a new theological approach from there. We need to tell the stories of the Holocaust victims in order to remember them because we cannot explain why the Holocaust happened; we just tell their stores and remember. [...]
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