The concept of a non-material reality is one that is not only fundamentally important but also highly debated in the field of philosophy. Different ideas and opinion abound over the division and labeling of various types of matter and reality, the source to obtain inferences on such a subject, and whether there even is a source or more than one form of matter. This paper aims to discuss and evaluate the claims of Descartes and Leibniz concerning a non-material basis for reality and simultaneously highlight the proposals of Locke and Hume as they relate to the formers' claims.
[...] What that means here is that anything which is clearly and distinctly seen to be separable from something else must be so in fact, for God certainly has the power to separate any two such things without essentially altering them. For something to not be its own essence is a contradiction, and everything is possible for God except contradictions - although clearly He can make any substance exist or not exist, or create something with a different essence. This allows Descartes to make the following argument: 1. [...]
[...] This leads to his claim that cause is internal and rests within each being or form with an active soul, which we will see shortly is remarkably similar to Locke's view of causal relationships. When compared, we can see that Locke uses the terms and but in different ways than Leibniz. While Leibniz uses ‘powers' to refer to something's internal will, soul, spirit, or cause, Locke uses the term to indicate a thing's potential, as in its potential for change: both to change and to be changed.(Cahn, 2004) While these two accounts are similar in many ways, it is important to note that Locke is using this as a basis for the argument that cause is internal and therefore cannot be discerned by the senses, and, while Leibniz may agree, he is using the terms as a basis to explain non-material reality. [...]
[...] (Cahn, 2004) Hume also attacks Leibniz's idea of the internal, and states that “experience doesn't make rational sense”.(Scott, 2004) Hume is also in disagreement about the existence of a non-material reality and clearly demonstrates this position when he attempts to connect thinking and ideas to sense perceptions in Hume's Fork. Hume and Leibniz do agree on one thing though: that experience doesn't provide a complete frame for understanding alone.(Scott, 2004) This is outlined clearly in Hume's take on cause and effect, and the extension of going from the present to the future- a time which has yet to be experienced. [...]
[...] Essentially, Locke is saying that relying on the self is more important then relying on either internal or external experience for understanding. Thus, if one considers that to be similar to what Descartes is saying when doubts the senses and then imagination, but not the which thinks, then the two philosophers can be said to be more or less in accord with one another on this topic. However, it should be remembered that Locke's support of a non-material reality is not blatantly explained; it is only inferred, and thus one must be careful not to make and rash assumptions. [...]
[...] In doing so, one of Hume's ideas that best represents his disagreement with Descartes is what is known as “Hume's our ideas are our copies of impressions, or, in other words, that it is impossible for us to think anything, which we have not antecedently felt, either by external or internal senses.” (Cahn, 2004) If Hume is right, it would mean that our intellect or mind is essentially running on copies of our sense perceptions and thus a connection between sense perceptions or material reality and the mind (or what Descartes so strongly argues is immaterial reality) can be made. [...]
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