In the study of Ontology, and more specifically the study of mereology, essentialism and dependence, or ontological dependence, are perennial issues, which pop up. In the case of the former issue, essentialism, this is merely the study of the essence of an ontological object. In the case of the latter, dependence, this is the issue of if, and how, an object is dependent on another object for its existence, either ontologically or logically. Numerous subsequent issues naturally appear as a result of asking the questions of a thing's essence and its dependence on other objects in reality for its existence. In short, there are two approaches, which one can take in order to wrestle with the questions that essentialism and dependence ask. These various approaches are seen as being modal and non-modal in nature. What will be done here in this paper is a brief look at the modal and non-modal theories of essentialism and dependence. In order to understand the debate as to what approach is the best, and thus most appropriate, one must understand the inherent contrariety that exists between modality and non-modality as concerning mereology.
[...] This is much different from saying, man can not stand unless ‘these particular air molecules' are pushing against his body'. The latter would be an observably, ontological event made up of observable entities (particular air molecules), but the former is the statement which carries the stronger claim, and thus, the more modal in nature. So, even in ontological dependence we see that modal mereology is more likely to stay in the realm of generic, more abstract notions of reality, instead of a more concrete (and phenomenological) format. [...]
[...] But, those who support a non-modal approach of mereological essentialism and dependence claim that it should be taken on a case by case basis anyway. After all, all entities are made up of parts. Brentano, Husserl's teacher, once theorized that if there exists a purely independent entity (say God), it (He)would have to be something along the lines of a disjointed entity from the rest of His creation. Brentano insisted that such an entity exists, putting it (God) in the formula ‘there either exists a unique entity (God) or an entity that is not a part of the whole of reality, which is the same [or something to this effect]). [...]
[...] The category of feline is certainly not a thing that is concrete and thus sustainable on phenomenological level. One can see a cat, a feline is only known through some sophisticated intellection. One must go through the various categorizations that species are in, and the features (usually scientific) associated with it. But, modal mereology is successful at identifying the essential parts of some things (essential parts being parts that an object must have in order to exist). Usually these things are of a scientific and abstract nature. [...]
[...] Husserl, in a non-modal manner, characterized the part-whole relationship not in a possibility/necessity schema, but rather by identifying, phenomenologically, the distinction between parts and their wholes. Once this was established, then parts, non-essential and essential ones, were categorized according to their ontological dependence. This establishment of a part as being ontological dependent upon, either, another part or the whole it makes up would consequently determine the nature of the part; whether it was an essential part to the entity or not. [...]
[...] Obviously, not all concrete parts of a whole are necessary for the entity's existence, and not all abstract and nominal parts are unnecessary for its existence. With this in mind, Fine suggests that there exists qua parts, which are parts that serve as, what he refers to as the gloss of, an entity. This can be illuminated by the predicate logical formula of Fa, where F is the predicate of a. What we predicate of this entity, which is is merely the gloss of the object and thus is a non-essential part of it. [...]
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