Aristotle within his Nicomachean Ethics defines the different regions of the soul, especially the virtues and functions of each. After all his contemplation over universal ideas, such as the very essence and base of justice and wisdom, he also realized the soul must contain a part to contemplate rational and changing ideas. This he defines in opposition to σoφíα, or intelligent wisdom, as φρόνησις, or practical wisdom. This complex idea, like Aristotle's soul, has many regions which need to be explained before an understanding of the thing can be obtained.
[...] Aristotle on the other hand argues that he was right in part, specifically in that φρόνησις is involved in some degree to each virtue but he goes on to say he was also wrong and that each virtue is a separate thing unto itself. He gives the simile that as medicine guides health, so too does practical wisdom guide virtue to action. In summary, Aristotle argued that φρόνησις is a virtue of thought, which acts in accordance with virtue of character. These two acting together decide what is the choice worthy goal for a given situation, and [...]
[...] Σoφíα, the counterpart of φρόνησις, is a result that starts by gaining nous, or understanding of the specific principles of a science, and then using that nous to form an episteme, or constructed argument. These constructed arguments apply originally to specific circumstances, but eventually give way to an understanding of the world or science as a whole as σoφíα. This scope of this virtue is similar to the scope of φρόνησις in that it begins with understanding of a small circumstance, choice, or situation, and then results a much wider understanding. Practical wisdom is entwined at its very beginning not only to action, but also to one's own hexis or disposition. [...]
[...] This paper must also examine the things that practical wisdom is concerned with, but before that we should describe exactly how this virtue fits into the soul. For Aristotle, three different divisions separated the soul. The first divided the soul into a top and a bottom, a reasoning part and a non- reasoning part. The next two split those two parts in half again. The part of the soul that lacks reason was then separated into a part that listens to reason and a part that does not. [...]
[...] A persons disposition is the part of them that causes how things appear to them, namely what will appear choice worthy and good when making a decision. This disposition is effected by habituation. Habituation is the process of choosing repeatedly an option; in this case the truly choice worthy, with the goal and effect that eventually the truly choice worthy will appear to you as truly choice worthy. By going through habituation the disposition will change its goals and aims, and eventually may put forth the truly good and truly choice worthy as its aim. [...]
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