When John Rawls publishes his Theory of Justice in 1971, he was the first to use the expression "reflective equilibrium" (RE). Even if this kind of idea had been employed before by Nelson Goodman (Goodman, 1955), Rawls employs it as his method, to build a complete theory of justice and sort out this concept which is now highly debated. We will not dwell on the complete definition of reflective equilibrium, but it is worth keeping in mind the definition given by Rawls himself: "It is equilibrium, because at last our principles and [considered] judgment coincide; and it is reflective since we know to what principles our judgments conform and the premises of their derivation" (Rawls, 1971). We won't dwell on the problem of the wide and narrow equilibrium either, and chose instead to follow Norman Daniels who considers essentially the wide reflective equilibrium (Daniels, 1996, chap 1). We will weigh how RE is a general and important question, by trying to involve both an inductive and deductive approach as a method to build a theory in social justice, which is a particular subject of philosophy.
[...] We tried to show here how the drawing up of a theory in social philosophy can be considered as a political process. Because the theory aims to apply to everyone in society, and because everyone has to accept it, we must then consider what our opinions are since there is no truth in politics. In this sense, we conclude that the RE could constitute an interesting way of knowledge by giving a place both to our own inductive subjectivity and to the rational principles, even if it is limited. [...]
[...] Apostle, Peripatetic Press Aspenger Christian and Van Parijs Phillipe, Ethique économique et sociale, Paris La Découverte Brandt Richard, A theory of the Good and the Right Camus Albert, Le mythe de Sisyphe Hume David, A treaty of Human Nature Kant Immanuel, Critique of Pure reason Kant Immanuel, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals Pascal Blaise, Les pensées Popper Karl, The Logic of Scientific Discovery Rawls John, independence of Moral Theory”, Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association Rawls John, A theory of social Justice, Harvard University Press Rawls John, Political Liberalism, New York NY: Columbia University Press Rousseau Jean-Jacques, Du Contrat social Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy December 2006-12-02, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reflective-equilibrium/ Hannah Arendt, "Truth and Politics", in: Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought, New York: Penguin For more information about this question, look at Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2003, part and especially in the work of Rawls, Anderheiden, and Rawls himself (1974 and 1993). [...]
[...] To sum up what we said until now, the method for constructing a theory of social justice is a political process, which therefore must not consider a definitive truth but rather be open to different moral approaches representing the diversity of opinions. We must now challenge the definition of which method could answer these criteria. Looking for a valid method in social justice We will now try to find in a first part the answer to our question above, by testing the RE with these criteria, and then see what could be the limits of this approach. [...]
[...] But it also shows that, like democracy which is a challenge, the RE is more a method of thinking which must always be adjusted than a definitive theory[6]. Another kind of criticism can be raised in regard to the role given to the intuition by the RE as a “philosophical loss” (Daniels P.160). Certain philosophers could indeed regret the importance given to the opinion of everyone, as opposed to many years of a philosophical thought led by the elite, well educated, thinking and seeking for a long time, concluded by a coherent system of knowledge and as close as possible to he truth. [...]
[...] So, if the question of how to construct a theory of social justice is a political process let us examine what it implies. One of the most famous recent philosophers about politics is certainly Hannah Arendt. Our point will be to show why we consider that there is no truth in politics, and our work can help us. Indeed, in her essay “Truth and politics” (Arendt, 1993), she aims at showing how the political scene is (or should be) an arena where agents confront their opinion, and not a place where a certain conception of what the decision should be must be imposed. [...]
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