Contemporary theories of Justice- Essay : is the principle of Fair Equality of Opportunity (FEO) defensible?

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[...] 38-44 • Williams, B., 'The Idea of Equality' in his Problems of the Self; also in L. Pojman and R. Westmoreland (eds.) Equality: Selected Readings, and J. Feinberg (ed.) Moral Concepts This principle is combined, in the rawlsian theory, with a principle of Equal Liberty for all and the difference principle that I will detail further. Justice as Fairness : a restatement p.44 Richards, J., 'Equality of Opportunity' in A. Mason (ed.) Ideals of Equality Singer, P., Practical Ethics, 2nde edn. [...]

[...] Indeed, other kinds of contingencies can affect the opportunities of those similarly endowed (such as friendships). Thus, even though Rawls accepts that ‘it is impossible in practice to secure equal chances of achievement for those similarly endowed, he does not see any reason to drop the FEO principle, and just proposes to ‘limit the understanding of what FEO involves'[20]. Several other reasons lead us to think that FEO is a requirement of justice. FEO is a part of the ideal of equal status of free and equal citizens, and is one of the social bases of self respect, insofar as the exclusion from social positions on discriminatory grounds is an affront to person's dignity. [...]

[...] In fact, in the family a person is born to bestow considerable advantages on some and disadvantages on others with regard to their future opportunities.[15] Thus, the familial experience is morally arbitrary, but the abolition of the family is not conceivable for Rawls insofar as it would violate the first principle of his theory, which includes freedom of association. It seems then that FEO is quite unrealistic. A final objection comes, among others, from Barry[16], who shows the extent to which moral arbitrariness could be an eternal objection to FEO, because any factor can be considered as morally arbitrary. Mason explains that it is hard to pretend that FEO is realisable if we reject all that is morally arbitrary. [...]

[...] Contemporary theories of Justice- Essay: Is the principle of Fair Equality of Opportunity (FEO) defensible? The principle of Fair Equality of Opportunity (FEO) is a part of Rawls' theory of justice, detailed in his Theory of Justice (1971)[1]. This principle emerges from Rawl's distinction of the classical liberal of ‘careers open to talents' -or ‘formal equality of opportunity'- from a more substantive idea, the FEO principle, which requires that citizens with the same talents and willingness to use them have the same educational and economic opportunities regardless of whether they were born rich or poor. [...]

[...] It is true that, assuming that FEO is required for equally talented people, Rawls do not try to reduce inequalities of opportunity between differently talented people. The FEO principle is, however, an exacting principle of equal opportunities. Indeed, it assumes the elimination of every kind of discriminations between, and it entails the implement of a free, compulsory and efficient school system.[18] As for the objection against Rawlsian equality of opportunity concerning family, and the scope of FEO, it finds a reply in Freeman and Mason essays. Fair equality of opportunity is made imperfectly realisable by the existence of family. [...]