History textbooks that deal with the birth of the Zionism repeatedly take for granted a major component of the movement's early success underlying British support. The beginning of the history of Israel is commonly preoccupied with Theodor Herzl or the Balfour Declaration, but very rarely is the question ever posed, why did the British ever even support Zionism in the first place? Pithy explanations are occasionally given that the British were the only powerful Europeans tolerant enough to accept Jews in the aftermath of dreadful pogroms and from there the Zionist movement was given freedom to flourish. However, such accounts do not fully explain what benefit Zionism would have provided to British policymakers. Conversely, explanations about the British maintaining interests in Egypt and the Suez Canal do not fully address the question of why it supported Zionism, specifically, in order to achieve these goals. Why not simply colonize the Palestinians directly if a buffer state was all that was desired? In light of these historical ambiguities, this paper will attempt to explore what exactly prompted Lloyd George's cabinet to support Jewish restoration to the Holy Land. However, the research focuses on a wide range of historical events and movements, and ironically, virtually no analysis of Lloyd George's cabinet was required to come to the final conclusions. Events of the nineteenth century played the most significant role, as the combination of a waning Ottoman Empire and a growing acceptance of Jewish culture in England coincided to allow the British to merge their ideological principles with the strategic interests of the Empire. The discussion will begin with an analysis of the latter half of this equation.
[...] British Policy in Palestine. Washington, D.C.: American Council on Public Affairs Herzl, Theodor. The Jewish State. New York: Scopus Publishing Company Hyamson, Albert. British Projects for the Restoration of the Jews. London: Petty and Sons (Leeds) Ltd Hyamson, Albert. A History of the Jews in England. Second Edition. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd Katz, David S. The Jews in the History of England 1850. Oxford, Clarendon Press Kedourie, Elie. England and the Middle East, the Destruction of the Ottoman Empire 1914 1921. London: [...]
[...] Such was the context for British policy in the East during a time of intense European competition and serious Ottoman decline, the combination of which forced Britain to think carefully about how to protect its precious domains. Communication with India was always a prominent issue for the imperialists since the traditional route, via sail, took anywhere from five to eight months to complete (Searight, 117). In 1830 the steamship route between England and Bombay was established, and five years later the overland route by way of Egypt was set up, shortening the journey by at least half when compared to the voyage around the Cape (Document E. [...]
[...] Likewise, the Indian Mutiny of 1857 and the subsequent establishment of the British Raj created a newfound need for tougher imperial security around Suez, which in turn raised the question of how to prevent invasion from European competitors. Working through the Arabs to achieve this goal of protection seemed neither desirable nor feasible from a British perspective, due both to the Arabs' distant cultural background and their lack of involvement in British politics. The Jews, on the other hand, provided a remarkably convenient solution to Britain's broader problems. [...]
[...] The notion of a Jewish state in Palestine that would be dependent on England seemed favorable to the English and a fair compromise to the Jews. Herzl states in Der Judenstaat that Jews “should [in Palestine] form a part of a wall of defense for Europe in Asia, an outpost of civilization against barbarism. We should as neutral states remain in contact with all Europe, which would have to guarantee our existence.” This mutual relationship of fidelity and dependence would ensure protection even in times of war. [...]
[...] His victory was viewed by the European Powers as both startling and threatening, since Russia, France, and England all had vested interests in maintaining a stable Ottoman Empire for the sake of a regional balance of power. Ibrahim's capacity to expand and perhaps even overtake the heart of vulnerable Anatolia added a whole new element to Europe's Great Game. After nine years of danger, the 1840 Treaty of London was signed, through which the European Powers negotiated Ibrahim's withdrawal from Syria in exchange for his right to establish hereditary rule in Egypt (Gelvin, 26). [...]
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