Ever since the early days of European colonization, Latin America has always been a hotbed of unequal distribution of wealth. Latin American economies suffer from disproportionately high rates of inequality, with the richest ten percent of the populace bringing in up to 51.5 percent (Brazil, 1999) of the available income within the country (Prevost 107). Wherever people feel they are not getting their fair share, there will be a struggle for change. In most countries, the European elite have typically been in the highest quintile of land and income distribution throughout the last few centuries (Prevost 106) and have angered many indigenous peoples and mestizos in this way. In two specific countries, Guatemala, and Bolivia, the concentration of native peoples within the population is among the highest of the region, with 40.5% and 55.0%, respectively (Prevost 84).
[...] Since Arévalo had banned the Communist Party altogether from Guatemala in years prior (Sicker 111), Arbenz was not found to have any connections with this group until he decided to legalize it once again during his administration, due to its significant influence in implementing reforms among unionized workers. Additionally, during Arbenz's run for the presidency, he had gathered the support of a coalition of liberals and leftists, some of whom were known as “communist elements” within their organizations (Fauriol 32). [...]
[...] The UFCO, in response to the series of expropriations, turned to the US government for help (Fauriol 31). Washington demanded that the Arbenz regime pay UFCO a retribution among of $ 16.5 million for the land, which Arbenz vehemently opposed. While the UFCO's opposition to the new government provided a base for support from its executives in Boston, other U.S. monopolies within the country were also at risk of competition from newly formed Guatemalan enterprises. The International Railways of Central America (IRCA) complained to the U.S. [...]
[...] After all, Bolivia was the largest Latin American recipient of economic aid from the United States during the 1950s, and the largest per capita recipient in the world during that same time period (Siekmeier 22).In fact, the United States was able to use foreign aid to coerce the MNR to give up many of its more radical land reform projects and to open its economy to foreign investment. In short, the ability of the U.S. government to show Bolivia that it was dependent on American support for survival allowed it to quell many of the more extreme reforms which it had planned to implement at the outset of the revolution. [...]
[...] What may have seemed like a great aspiration for Guatemala, during this time period of dictatorships and Cold War politics throughout the rest of the world, took a sharp turn when a CIA orchestrated coup d'état overthrew the president, Jacobo Arbenz, and installed in his place a U.S.-favored dictatorship. The new administration would go on to lead Guatemala into a thirty-year civil war and leave the country as one of the poorest in the hemisphere at the turn of the twenty first century (Prevost 295). [...]
[...] How would the United States have governed this far away country, which at the time possessed so little infrastructure? Having gone from military government to revolutionary democracy, Bolivia's foundations were very weak in the early 1950s. In summary, the entire American intrusion in Guatemala, and the careful nonintervention in Bolivia provide a perfect model for the entirety of the remaining Cold War political era. Using cautious intelligence capabilities, the United States was able to secure its interests in both Bolivia and Guatemala through the use of its . [...]
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