The "encirclement chess" or the game of Go is a typical Asian game of strategy which is popular among Chinese generals. The preparation of strategic action in time of peace, the primary objective of control of a sphere of influence, the action developed from the periphery to the center or during the confrontation: the disconnection encirclement and annihilation are among the common traits of the strategy games of the Far East. This doctrine was particularly adopted in China at the beginning of the civil war in 1927. The 1927 civil war fostered the great tradition of revolt by encouraging the emergence of the first peasant associations in Hunan. Thereby, it tried to assert the role of peasants in the revolutionary struggle for the establishment of a Republic of China. In September 1927, strong disagreements with the new leader of the Kuomintang forced him to flee to the mountains, the theater of the original armed revolt of the peasants. Until 1934, the first peasant revolutionary army managed to escape the clutches of the Chinese Nationalist Party and its armies which had more manpower and ammunitions. Subsequently, Chinese history was rewritten with the Long March which witnessed the retreat of the Red Army of the Communist Party of China. When Mao Zedong applied the strategy described by the game of Go both in principle and in theory, the People's Liberation Army was created. Leninism provided him with a solution that was innovative and mobilized people politically and militarily. Mao employed the strategy of Go with several "players" whereas the Stalinist orthodoxy recognized the fundamental role of only the industries and urban proletariat. Mao wanted to "encircle the cities from the countryside". This theory is incorporated in Mao's 'Strategic Problems in China's Revolutionary War',published in 1936 and probably written during the period when the revolutionary army faced many defeats
[...] On these "territories of revolutionary bases" is a population that participated actively in the development of the Army and its consolidation, it was also a population that entered the system set up by Mao and adhered to his political ideas. More than places of rest, these bases were also places of strong propaganda. A larger proportion of the population, being involved in the revolutionary war, rallied to the political ideology of the CCP. For all these features, the Red Army was organized according to the progress of the enemy, it had the advantage of being the one entity that sees without being seen and therefore acting in response to the movements and trajectories of the regular army of the KMT: "Is the enemy advancing? [...]
[...] The latter was organized around two elements: mobility and the number The role of the population for the military offensive Problems of Strategy in the revolutionary war in China by Mao emphasizes that "The essential requirements for carrying out operations of annihilation are: the support of the population, favorable positions, an opponent that we can beat easily, the effect of surprise, and so on." This was both to promote the success of the offensive and to put the opponent at a disadvantage to get a change in the balance of power. [...]
[...] If the support of the people appeared to be the most important condition, choosing favorable positions and imposing its will on the attacker was one of the benefits of operations on exterior lines. The command could then choose the detachments of the army that would be affected. Mao insisted that foresight and prior knowledge about the enemy would be instrumental in eliminating an opponent easily. Was he morally or physically exhausted? Had he committed any serious errors in judgment or strategy? [...]
[...] The dualism of operations of annihilation:The weakening of the enemy combined to strengthen the Red Army The Revolutionary War required proper mobility for it to succeed. Thus, the Red Army had to adopt high level logistics in order to ensure the smooth running of various levels of the campaign. The genius of Mao solved this problem "by creating the industry of war, we must ensure that this does not lead to an increased dependence of the Red Army with respect to this industry. [...]
[...] As emphasized by Gérard Chaliand, "the success of the revolutionary war in China can be attributed to the existence of a party that managed to build a broad popular base and posed as champion of both patriotism and social change Even if his exercise of power sharing is not without the vestiges of a negative image, Mao, the theoretician of the revolutionary war and illustrious political-military campaigns remains an exceptional personality and his writings have undeniably played an important role in the political and military culture of the twentieth century. [...]
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