George H. Bush, Cold War, Reagan, neoconservative, administration, US policy, Scowcroft, National Security Adviser, Iraq, diplomacy, politics, Soviet crisis, fall of Berlin Wall, Warsaw Pact, liberal democracy, international, Gorbachev, USSR, Washington, NATO, Kohl, German reunification, Malta summit, George W. Bush, United Nations, globalization
President George H. Bush was elected in November 1988. He had to steer the end of the Cold War, 1989-1990. His team was different from Reagan's, although he had been his vice-president: there were no neo-conservatives; the new Administration was more adept of Kissinger's prudent line. Scowcroft, the National Security Adviser, acted quite along that cautious tradition of US policy. He put more stress on evolution and balances than on sudden change, even if the end of Soviet communism was greeted by him and the Bush Administration with joy (he is now a critic of current US policy in Iraq).
The new Administration built up on the foundation of strength created by the Reagan presidency, but managed the end of the Cold War in a more precise and astute way than the former Administration would probably have done. Reagan had a vision, more so than Bush who was more pragmatic, but his presidency was not terribly good in day-to-day diplomacy and crisis management. Just those qualities were the major contribution of the Bush team.
[...] The optimism felt by the US after what was also, after all, its victory over Soviet communism, may have contributed blinding many in Washington about the real and dangerous world situation. [...]
[...] The US had a clear policy: there would be no way to accept the neutralization of Germany and the end of NATO, which was conceived as a major tool for US security and influence. All efforts were made to let that Soviet strategy of damage control and limited retreat fail, and those efforts were successful: reunited Germany remained in NATO, and NATO remained the mainstay of US policy in Europe, despite the ulterior motives in Moscow (and partly in Paris, where many wished the new situation would allow the creation of a new security order in Europe, less dependent on the US). [...]
[...] - While NATO remained a major tool of American influence in Europe. - In that multilateral framework, with good relations with both the Allies and the former adversaries, America could play to the full its role of the only remaining superpower, of the "benevolent hegemon". As the analyst Francis Fukuyama asserted in 1990: the victory of liberal democracy everywhere would usher in a lasting peace in the final reconciliation of mankind: "the end of History" But that was a bit too optimistic . [...]
[...] Bush's success: a "new world order" Gorbachev accepted all American conditions, stopped Soviet support of insurgents in Central America, accepted Germany's reunification, and the evacuation of Eastern Europe against considerable domestic opposition (which led to the attempted coup in August 1991, which nearly toppled Gorbachev, who survived largely thanks to American support). Gorbachev accepted even not to veto the UN resolution to liberate Kuwait from Iraq in 1990, which led to the Gulf War in January 1991. Although Iraq was an old client of Moscow. [...]
[...] He had to steer the end of the Cold War, 1989-1990. His team was different from Reagan's, although he had been his vice-president: there were no neoconservatives; the new Administration was more adept of Kissinger's prudent line. Scowcroft, the National Security Adviser, acted quite along that cautious tradition of US policy. He put more stress on evolution and balances than on sudden change, even if the end of Soviet communism was greeted by him and the Bush Administration with joy. [...]
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