The Eurostar Group is an EEIG (European Economic Interest E) which is responsible for managing commercial passenger service on the Paris London route among others. The fleet of 27 trains is owned by three companies belonging to the EEIG (SNCF, SNCB and EUKL). Each of these three companies is responsible for the operation of Eurostar services on their respective territories, and employs its own staff. As we shall see, the incidents we will study have taken place on the French side of the trail, for which the SNCF is responsible, and who has faced the "crisis".
Six hundred twenty-five passengers on Eurostar arrived on Saturday morning in Paris from London, instead of the scheduled time of 2h 15, a delay of nearly nine hours. Passengers had left the train at Lille once, and then boarded a second train, one which also crashed in the countryside (Sum), for an unknown reason. Railway police and firemen then intervened as a precaution, though there were no major incidents. A third empty train left Paris to rescue passengers. The transfer of passengers to this train was completed, and the train went back to the Gare du Nord in Paris.
By Monday morning, the first version of the technical report was provided by the SNCF. According to the report, the 1 train had not been emptied of its passengers because of an incident. This version was expected, and reflects the organizational constraints of crossings of the Channel Tunnel. The second event was the inevitable technical problem with traction. According to the report, the driver of the train had made a mistake by not relaying the warning sooner. If this were the case, the third train would have arrived earlier which would have allowed passengers to not have to spend so much time alone in the countryside.
[...] To reassure users of EUROSTAR who were obviously aware of the incidents, the SNCF launched an external communications plan to show that the problem was exceptional, and that it would not happen again. The establishment of the crisis and the external communication plan was the second financial impact of the incident. To respond to the customer dissatisfaction arising from the incident, the SNCF has put in place measures for compensation. It has offered its customers a full refund of the fare and offered them a free round-trip. [...]
[...] Yet there are risk manager within the SNCF group, as well as in the operational field, who are trained and expected to be reactive and operational in the event of a serious problem like that. There is thus in the group's regular update, a comprehensive plan to manage potential crises, which is used to train operatives in the field. The SNCF Group also sets up regularly, (at least every 2 years) a full-scale simulation of a major crisis in a train (accident, fire, etc.) involving all stakeholders. [...]
[...] The crew is impacted directly, because they are the ones who have had to face the discontent of stranded travelers, and had to manage risk in real time. Moreover, it appears that the train driver is partly responsible for the mismanagement of the second incident. b. External actors The travelers were the main "victims" of this risk. They are the ones who had to bear the consequences and impact of various incidents. Emergency services (police, firemen . ) intervened in both the countryside and on arrival. [...]
[...] Obviously, management has ensured that these actions were known to the trade press as quickly as possible, so that the customer was reassured, especially after the almost total lack of communication during the incident. Besides, in general, the management of Eurostar has made big effort to communicate to the general public through a series of press releases and also appeared in some media. The CEO of Eurostar, Guillaume Pepy, was quick to take public responsibility for this major incident, The state of the train has been underestimated. It should never have started from Lille. I accept the full responsibility of SNCF in this extremely spectacular, but rare incident." [...]
[...] The transfer of passengers to this train was completed, and the train went back to the Gare du Nord in Paris. By Monday morning, the first version of the technical report was provided by the SNCF. According to the report, the 1 train had not been emptied of its passengers because of an incident. This version was expected, and reflects the organizational constraints of crossings of the Channel Tunnel. The second event was the inevitable technical problem with traction. According to the report, the driver of the train had made a mistake by not relaying the warning sooner. [...]
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